Innovation processes under patent protection generate holdup problems if complementary patents are owned by different firms. We show that in line with Hart and Moore (1990) , shareholder ownership overlap across firms with patent complementarities helps mitigate such holdup problems and correlates significantly with higher intensive and extensive margins of patent production. The positive innovation effect of shareholder overlap is strongest for active investors (such as hedge funds) and for concentrated overlapping ownership. We also show that shareholder overlap is related to higher R&D expenditure and less patent litigation and increases for active investors before the patent filing of the downstream firm becomes public information.
Introduction
While technological progress is recognized as the main source of long-run economic growth, its relation with corporate ownership structure and property rights in patents is less understood.
This paper provides a new empirical perspective on the role of the equity ownership structure in attenuating holdup problems induced by patent protection in the corporate innovation process.
Patents protection provides the inventor with exclusive rights to the commercial use of his discoveries. But, such discoveries are often part of a larger technological process of interdependent innovations, in which the full economic value of a patent might only be unlocked if the innovating firm can simultaneously secure access to many complementary patents. Therefore, patent processes generate holdup problems whenever such complementary patents are owned by different firms and ex-ante contracting is incomplete. 1 Building on the property rights theory of Hart and Moore (1990) , we argue that joint equity ownership in the innovating firm and firms controlling complementary patents can attenuate the holdup problem and contribute to the patent success of the innovating firm. From the perspective of an equity investors who owns shares in both the upstream and downstream firm, any hold-up in pursuit of patent rents is costly and his interest consists in a swift conflict resolution without patent litigation. We develop a simple model of optimal patent investment to show how such joint equity ownership can increase the intensive and extensive margins of the patent production.
An important implication from our model is that a liquid equity market with flexible equity ownership across various innovating firms can promote innovation and technological progress, and such an institution is particularly important under the current patent environment featuring an increasingly extensive patent protection and a proliferation of patent rights.
To subject this property right perspective of patent success to an empirical examination, we combine a large sample of U.S. patent data from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) with institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters for the period 1991-2010. In particular, we track stock ownership not only for the innovating firms, but also for firms owning the complementary patents. The complementarities are identified directly from the patent filings that explicitly list important precursory patents owned by other firms. By law, each newly filed patent must list prior precursory (upstream) patents that are technologically related and material to the patentability of the new application. 2 These upstream patents might have to be licensed to the (downstream) innovator for him to realize the full value of the new patent (Ziedonis, 2004;  Noel and Schankerman, 2013; Galasso and Schankerman, 2010). 3 Our analysis identifies potential patent holdup based on this list of precursory patents and assumes that the list is exogenously determined by the technology to be patented. Patent examiners frequently add precursory patent to the reference list, suggesting a limited scope by the patent filing firms in manipulating the reference list of precursory patents (Alcácer, Gittelman, and Sampat, 2009 ). 4 Our main hypothesis states that joint equity ownership between the downstream innovator and the upstream firms controlling complementary patents attenuates holdup problems, increases R&D investment, and contributes to the long-run patent success of the innovating firm. Following the existing literature, we measure patent success by the cumulative citation count of each patent that was filed and granted; this measure can be viewed as the intensive margin of patent production. 5 The extensive margin of patent production is measured by the number of successful patents (i.e., patent applications that are eventually approved by USPTO) a firm files in a given year. Our baseline analysis relates firm-level patent success ((1+CITES)) to shareholder overlap ().
The former is calculated as the (log of) total number of future citations for all patents a firm filed in a given year, whereas the latter measures the average aggregate (percentage) shares held by the group of shareholders that invest in both the patent filing firm and the firms owning upstream complementary patents. Consistent with the holdup attenuation hypothesis of joint equity ownership, we find that  emerges as the statistically and economically most significant determinant of patent success, and it is positively related to both the intensive and extensive margin of patent production. This result holds regardless of whether  is measured based on equity ownership overlap in the year just before the patent application or two to four years prior 2 The U.S. patent law requires an invention to be useful, novel, and non-obvious to be patented. 3 Ziedonis (2004) argues that owners of the (upstream) cited patents are reasonable proxies for the potential licensors of the citing patent. Noel and Schankerman (2013) and Galasso and Schankerman (2010) also suggest that a greater number of upstream assignees can signal a greater number of negotiations and disputes required for the commercialization of the downstream patent. 4 Patent examiners in USPTO are officially responsible for constructing the list of prior art references. However, inventors also have a "duty of candor" to disclose all material prior art, and failure to do so can result in an "inequitable conduct" and the court may render the patent unenforceable. Using data from USPTO for all patents granted over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] , Alcácera, Gittelmanb, and Sampatc (2009) document that examiners insert at least one citation in 92% of patent applications. Overall, examiner citations account for 63% of all citations made by an average patent. 5 See for example Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales (2013) for a similar definition of firm level patent success.
to the application date.
We further hypothesize that shareholder overlap may represent an even more powerful mechanism for holdup resolution if the respective shareholders are so-called "activist" shareholders. In particular, more active investors such as hedge funds should contribute more to the resolution of rent extraction problems than other less active investors. Consistent with this intuition, we find a much stronger effect of shareholder overlap on patent success when such overlap or joint ownership originates in hedge fund holdings.
Another related hypothesis concerns the ownership concentration of the group of overlapping investors. If the downstream innovating firm and upstream firms are jointly owned by only a few relatively large shareholders, coordinated action might be easier to organize, and shareholders may have stronger incentives to resolve a potential holdup. In accordance with this prediction, we find that the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of (overlapping) shareholder ownership concentration correlates positively with firm-level patent success beyond the shareholder overlap itself. Thus, coordination and contracting problems not only are an issue with respect to ex-ante bargaining between different patent owners, but also constrain the overlapping shareholders in their effort to overcome the ex-ante bargaining failures.
Our analysis controls for a variety of firm characteristics and also applies firm and time fixed
effects. Yet, unobservable time-varying and firm-specific factors may still pose an inference problem if they influence both shareholder overlap and patent success. Therefore, we reproduce our regressions at the patent level while controlling for interacted firm and time fixed effects. These specifications directly compare the success of any two patents (in term of their future citations)
filed by the same firm in the same year. We show that even within the same firm-year, patent success is correlated with the varying degree of holdup across a firm's cohort of patents. economically weak relation with a firm's long-run patent success once we control for shareholder overlap. We also control for a number of other variables, which include the previous R&D investment (1 + & ) a measure of relative capital intensity (1 + ), a firm size measure (1 + ), and year and industry (or firm) fixed effects. Yet, the relation between the holdup attenuation factor-shareholder overlap-and future patent success remains both statistically and economically significant even with these controls.
To the best of our knowledge, the role of stock market ownership structure in mitigating holdup problems in patent processes has not been subject to any systematic analysis. Ex-ante contracting about access to auxiliary patents is difficult before the feasibility and commercial potential of a new patent are established. Consequently, ex-post holdup should reduce ex-ante investment incentives unless such rent extraction can be mitigated by overlapping equity ownership (especially from activist investors). We also note that for such a positive effect on ex-ante investment incentives to occur, the shareholder overlap needs to be acquired before the share prices of the upstream firms patent reform in pursuit of more narrowly and clearly defined patent rights against the background of dramatic increase in patent litigation (Schlicher, 2011, chapter 8) .
fully reflect the holdup rents. 7 In the following section, we survey the related literature. Section 3 develops a simple model of patent holdup in the spirit of Hart and Moore (1990) ; it develops the main hypotheses and motivates the regression specifications. Section 4 discusses the data; Section 5 presents the main evidence for the role of shareholder overlap for patent success. Section 6 features related evidence on the role of shareholder overlap for R&D expenditure and patent litigation as well as the endogenous adjustment of shareholder overlap over the patent cycle. Various robustness checks are undertaken in Section 7, followed by conclusions in Section 8.
Related Literature
Existing studies on patent holdup problems (e.g., Shapiro, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004; and Hall and Ziedonis, 2007) find that licensing agreements are commonly used in practice-yet these might typically concern the ex-post rent allocation. Licensing agreement may involve substantial royalty fees and their negotiation may not represent a frictionless process. Alternatively, a firm may invent around the patented technology to avoid being held up, but this is not always possible given the cumulative and sequential nature of technological development. There is also evidence that firms seek outright ownership integration via mergers to resolve patent disputes. However, such merger cases are often challenged by court and eventually fail for anti-competitive reasons (Creighton and Sher, 2009 ). Our study suggests that in liquid equity markets, partial ownership integration via ownership overlap may be achieved at lower costs or may already exist if large institutional shareholders happen to hold shares in both concerned firms.
Notwithstanding its prominence in economic theory, the property rights view of the boundaries of the firm has seen very few empirical applications because of a variety of obstacles. First, non-contractible holdup problems might often be difficult to identify in a complicated business environment. Explicit citation of precursory patents in the patent documents provides a unique identification opportunity. Second, any underinvestment at the project level also tends to be difficult to measure because a firm can shift investments to other projects for which holdup prob- 
where cites  () is a random variable with the expected value [cites  ()] =   , and   0 is a constant. The total expected firm value Π  follows as
where the interval [0 ] denotes the range of patent projects the firm pursues. Value maximization implies the first-order condition
characterizes the optimal range of patent production. We summarize the model implications as follows:
Proposition 1: Patent Production without Patent holdup
A value maximizing firm optimally invests in the production of patents on the line
proportional to each patent's expected value and a convex cost function () =    we find for (i) the (log) extensive margin of patent production
(ii) the firm-level (log) citation counts
(iii) the (log) R&D expenditure
The firm-level (log) citation count in Eq. (5) is equal to the (log) extensive margin in Eq.
(4) plus the (log) intensive margin [cites  ()] = (  ) Empirically, we can approximate the intensive margin by the average citation count cites  of a firm's patents.
The Patent Holdup Effect
Next, we enrich the model setting to account for holdup problems with respect to the patent value   () Suppose that commercialization of each patent  requires consent from the owners of upstream patent   with  = 1 2   . 9 These upstream patents allow their owners to extract part of the value (through, e.g., license fees) so that the firm's expected patent value decreases.
We denote the share of patent value lost to each upstream patent by   (   ) and the aggregate value loss by
The share   () ∈ [0 1] and its component   (   ) depend on the "toughness" of bargaining by the owner of the upstream patent    In the ideal case in which the institutional owners of firm  coincide with those of the firms owning   (=1, 2, 3, ...,   ), no rent extraction should take 9 Note that   does not include any expired patents because they do not pose any threat to the commercialization of the citing patent. place so that   () =   (   ) = 0. By contrast, the maximal rent extraction occurs if there is no overlap in institutional ownership between the downstream innovating firm and the upstream cited firms. For simplicity, we assume that the ex-ante expectation for value loss is identical for all patents  produced by the same firm; hence, [  ()] =    Besides the direct value loss due to rent extraction, the holdup situation might also reduce the total value prospect of each individual patent itself. For example, patent litigation may retard the commercial adoption of a patent and jeopardize its long-run success. We assume that the expected number of citations diminishes according to
where  denotes the elasticity of the expected patent success (measured by future citation count)
to the retained value share, 1 −   , with  ≥ 0 In the special case  = 0 patent holdup does not compromise the overall long-term patent success, and instead it amounts to only a simple redistribution of future rents. The expected net value from patent  follows as
The optimal investment policy in the holdup case requires maximization of the expected present value function
where the optimal patent range [0   ] has the upper limit
Proposition 2: Patent Production in the Patent Holdup Case A value maximizing firm optimally invests in the production of patents on the line
 that is proportional to the expected patent value, a convex cost function () =   , and an (ex-ante) expected value loss   = [  ()] for each patent due to patent holdup, we find for (i) the (log) extensive margin of patent production
(ii) the firm-level (log) citation count
The first and second terms in Eq. (13) are the same as those in Eq. (5). The third term in Eq. (13) and Eq. (14) captures how the holdup problem reduces, respectively, the overall patent success and R&D expenditure. All three equations feature the same (log) loss term
We also note that the holdup problem affects not only the extensive margin (  ), but also the
Patent holdup and Shareholder Overlap
The model estimation has to define empirical proxies for the patent-specific holdup loss   () and its unconditional expected value [  ()] =    Our basic assumption is that shareholder overlap reduces holdup. Let () be an ownership function that assigns a patent  to a (single) firm owner at time  The pairwise (institutional) shareholder overlap between the downstream patent  and upstream patent   (listed in the patent filings) can be defined as
where  () and  () are the ownership share (relative to the total institutional ownership of the respective firm) of institutional investor  in, respectively, firms () and (  ) at time .
Without loss of clarity, we omit the time index  from all variable expressions in this subsection.
We assume the following reduced form for the distributive value loss function associated with the upstream patent   cited by patent :
where weight function (  ) measures the importance of the upstream patent   relative to all other upstream cited patents of the follow-up patent . The parameter  ∈ [0 1] denotes the degree to which separate asset ownership translates into patent revenue sharing; a larger value for  implies more rent redistribution due to ownership separation. The total redistributed rents to the   upstream patent holders aggregate to a redistributive loss for patent , given by
We can define patent-level shareholder overlap as
For the   patents filed by firm  at year , we can approximate the average holdup loss as
where the weight () denotes the relative importance of patent  The firm-level shareholder overlap can be defined as
which captures shareholder commonality between firm  and all other firms owning the upstream patents The holdup loss term in Proposition 2 can be approximated by
and substitution makes the model directly testable. The expression   capture the holdup attenuation through firm-level shareholder overlap relative to a total (non-attenuated) holdup effect embodied by  A final measurement issue concerns the choice of weights reflecting the relative importance of any patents  and    Empirically, we measure the relative importance by the relative (log) citation count as follows:
and
In the robustness section (Section 7), we show that an alternative weighting scheme using a (nonparametric) rank measure of future citations () in Eq. (21) delivers very similar results.
The results are also robust to using equal weights, albeit at a slightly weaker level of economic significance.
Hypotheses
We summarize the main testable hypotheses in this subsection. The hypotheses H1, H2, H4, and H5 follow directly from model, whereas hypotheses H3, H6, and H7 are extensions based on simple economic arguments.
H1: Firm Patent Success and Holdup Attenuation
The patent success of firm  (in terms of future citation CITES  ) for its cohort of patents filed in year  should increase in the firm-level shareholder overlap  −1 between the firm itself and all other firms owning cited upstream patents that pose potential holdup problems. In our main empirical analysis, we measure  −1 based on equity ownership at the end of year  − 1. In the robustness analysis (Section 7), we further verify our results using ownership measured in years  − 2 to  − 4.
H2: Extensive and Intensive Margins of Patent Production
The extensive margin of patent production (proxied by the number of patents   filed by firm  in year  and eventually granted) correlates positively with the firm-level shareholder overlap  −1  The intensive margin cites  (which measures the average citation success of a firm's patents) should also correlate positively with  −1 if patent holdup involves not only value redistribution but also (inefficient) value destruction (i.e.,   0).
A straightforward extension of the holdup hypothesis distinguishes between shareholder types.
We conjecture that active shareholders (such as hedge funds) should be more willing and/or more capable of exercising their ownership power to resolve patent holdup than more passive shareholders (such as most pension funds). Moreover, a more concentrated ownership among overlapping shareholders should overcome the free-rider problem of costly lobbying and contribute to patent holdup resolution.
H3: Shareholder Type and Concentration of Shareholder Overlap
Shareholder overlap should feature a more positive correlation with patent success if the respective overlap is contributed by more active shareholders and if the overlapping equity stake is concentrated among few shareholders.
The patent holdup and its patent-specific attenuation through shareholder overlap should operate not only at the firm level, but also across different patents filed by the same firm in the same year. Accordingly, we can formulate the following within firm hypothesis: This latter hypothesis has the advantage that it can be tested using a rich set of interacted firm-year fixed effects-thereby controlling for time varying unobservable firm heterogeneity.
Based on Eq. (14) we can be summarize the role of shareholder overlap for the ex-ante investment incentives as follows:
Direct evidence for patent holdup consist in patent litigation between the upstream and downstream patent firms. We conjecture that the likelihood of such costly judiciary conflict is reduced by shareholder overlap because the joint owners of the subject companies have strong incentives to avoid the 'negative-sum-game' of litigation. We can directly test the following hypothesis:
H6: Patent Litigation
Less holdup under more shareholder overlap is reflected in less patent litigation.
If shareholder overlap is indeed an effective mechanism to alleviate patent holdup and contributes to efficiency through better ex-ante investment incentives, we expect shareholder ownership to dynamically adjust so as to reduce or even minimize holdup inefficiencies. Importantly, shareholder overlap should increase before holdup rents are reflected in the share prices of the upstream firms. Otherwise, the acquisition of ownership overlap amounts to an implicit payment it is granted unless the invention is already known by others at the patent application stage.
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According to Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), it takes on average 18 months for a patent's application to be approved and about 95% of successful patent applications are granted within 3 years of application, so the lag between patent filing and the first citation can range from zero to three years or longer.
At the firm level, we aggregate the count statistic   to the total number of future patent citations generated by all granted patents filed by firm  in year , denoted by    . Selfcitations are excluded, and patent and citation counts are set to zero whenever there is no patent or citation information provided in the data. We also examine the extensive margin of patent 10 The data set includes information on the patent number, name of the patent assignee, the number of citations received by a patent, application and grant year of the patent, etc. We thank Prof. Noah Stoffman for making the data set available to us.
11 USPTO currently publishes patent applications18 months after their filing dates for patents filed on or after November 29, 2000. Earlier patent applications were generally not published. (See the note at http://www.uspto.gov.) production   , defined as the number of successful patent filings (i.e., patent applications that are eventually granted) by firm  in year  The corresponding intensive margin is measured by the average cites per patent cites  (which equals the ratio of    to   ). Because most of these patent related measures feature highly right skewed distribution, we generally apply a log transformation (1 + ) in order to obtain more normally distributed variables for regression analysis.
We carefully adjust for the two truncation problems commonly associated with patent data.
First, the patent data set only includes those patents that are eventually granted, so many patent follows the definition in Eq. (19) and is based on the ownership data at the end of year  − 1 for patents filed in year . We measure ownership overlap at year  − 1 to reduce the scope for reverse causality from patent applications (in year ) to shareholder ownership changes and therefore variations in .
Because expired patents should not create any holdup problems, we ignore cited patents that are filed 20 years before the application date of the citing patents in constructing  12 Moreover, we discard firm-year observations when a firm does not have any successful patent application. We track potential holdup situations only for those cases for which both the patent filing firm and the upstream patent owner are publicly listed firms. Upstream patents owned by private (non-listed) companies do not enter into the  measure as we cannot determine any ownership overlap in these cases. Successful patent filings for which none of the upstream patent owners is a publicly listed firm are again discarded from the sample. Generally, downstream firm owners should find it difficult to acquire an overlapping ownership stake in a private firm, thus limiting the scope of the attenuation effect. 13 The citation count variable as a proxy for patent success has the important advantage that it can be measured not only at the firm level but also at the patent level. Analogously, we can also measure shareholder overlap at both the firm level () and the patent level (), based on Eq. (18) . The weighted sum of the patent-level shareholder overlap amounts to the firm-level shareholder overlap, as implied by Eq. (19) .
We also use a series of control variables, namely the previous R&D investment (1 + &  −1 ) a measure of relative capital intensity (1 +  −1 ), and a firm size measure (1 +  −1 ). For simplicity, (1 + ) is abbreviated as (1 + ).
To calculate these control variables, we obtain the accounting data from Compustat and the stock price and shares outstanding data from CRSP. Firm-level regressions also control for the presample mean citation count for each firm, which is measured by the aggregate citation count of a firm's patents filed over the pre-sample period 1976-1991, divided by the number of pre-sample years. For firms without patent filings during this period, the value is set to zero.
Our final sample includes all U.S. publicly listed firms that have at least two successful patent applications over the sample period 1992-2007. We require each firm to have at least two valid observations because we control for firm fixed effects in our main regression specifications. Our final sample 3 053 firms. We exclude all firm-year observations with missing values for the explanatory variables. The summary statistics are reported in Table 1 Fixed time effects are included in all regressions to exclude that the shareholder overlap measure 13 The exclusion of privately held patents presumably creates a measurement error for  unless shareholder overlap with such patent owning firms is zero. However, we conjecture that such shareholder overlap with privately held companies may indeed be generally negligible.
does not capture any parallel time trend in patent success. We provide the detailed definitions of all variables in the appendix.
Evidence on Patent Success

Baseline Specification
Our baseline regression specification follows Eq. (13) and Eq. (20) . As some firms in our sample feature patents without any citations, we replace the term [CITES ] with [1+CITES ] in our main regression specification as follows:
where the coefficient of interest is  1 = ( Columns 2-3 and 5-6 control for year and firm fixed effects. We report robust t-statistics allowing for two-way clustering at the firm and year (or patent cohort) level.
The baseline regression shows that shareholder overlap  represents a statistically highly significant explanatory variable; the point estimate of 4708 in Column 1 implies that an increase in shareholder overlap by one standard deviation (or 0108) increases patent success in terms of overall log firm citation ([1+CITES ]) by 24% of its standard deviation of 2084, suggesting that shareholder overlap has an economically large attenuation effect on patent success. Inclusion of firm fixed effects in Columns 2 limits the explanatory power of  to intertemporal variations in patent success within a firm; yet, the point estimate for the  coefficient remains large at 4149
The three control variables seem largely redundant in the firm fixed-effect regression (reported in Column 2) because their exclusion in Column 3 yields a very similar regression coefficient of 4266 for  Columns 4-6 repeat these regression for the three R&D intensive sectors. As expected, we find even stronger  effect in these sectors. The point estimate of 5894 in Column 4 implies that increase of  by one standard deviation (or 0106) increases the citation count by roughly 2718% of its standard deviation of 2299 The firm fixed effect regressions in Columns 5-6 identify only within firm variation in patent success, but shareholder overlap remains a statistically and economically highly significant covariate with or without inclusion of the other controls.
The control variables generally have the expected signs when firm fixed effects are excluded (Columns 1 and 4). A higher stock of cumulative R&D spending correlates positively with future patent success. Firm size measured by (1 + ) also correlates positively with the overall number of citations a firm receives, suggesting that large firms may generally be in a better position to assure the long-run success of their patents or may simply launch more successful patents. In the long run, it's possible that these "control variables" are also be influenced by the patent process itself. For example, if shareholder overlap is positively related to patent success, the latter can also be reflected in larger  and a higher & , thereby disqualifying both as exogenous conditioning control variables. In this case, their exclusion from the regression, as reported in Columns 3 and 6, represents the most reliable inference on the positive effect of shareholder overlap on patent success.
Intensive versus Extensive Margins
Shareholder overlap may affect the intensive and extensive margins differently. Moreover, separate specifications for them reveal different regression parameters. The specification for the intensive margin follows Eqs. (8) and (20) 
where  1 =   0 captures the positive effect of less patent holdup due to shareholder overlap.
The parameter  measures the efficiency loss of patent holdup as opposed to the distributional loss through rent dissipation measured by . Rejection of  1 = 0 in favor of  1  0 would imply   0, suggesting that the holdup problem produces an adverse effect on the average success of the innovating firm's patents, beyond the loss of rent redistribution to the upstream firms. corresponds to an increase in the average citation count per patent by about 23% of its standard deviation. Inclusion of firm fixed effects in Column 2 restricts the identification of the shareholder overlap effect to intertemporal firm variation, but  still yields an economically and statistically highly significant estimate. This finding is also robust to the exclusion of the control variables, as shown in Column 3.
The empirical specification for the extensive margin of patent production follows Eqs. (12) and (20) as
where  corresponds to the   in our model description in Section 3.2. 17 The model implied coefficient for the holdup effect is
The regression results for the extensive margin are presented in Table 3 , Columns 4-6. The point estimate of 1576 again suggests strong economic significance for the shareholder overlap measure; a one-standard-deviation increase in  is associated with a 12% increase in the number of patents relative to its standard deviation of 1435. The coefficient retains its economic and statistical significance in the specification with firm fixed effects in Columns 5. This finding is gain robust to the exclusion of the three control variables, shown in Column 6.
Overall, the results suggest that shareholder overlap is strongly associated with both more citations for each granted patent (i.e., the intensive margin of patent success) and the number of granted patents (i.e., the extensive margin of patent production). Because both regression coefficients  1 =  and
 are strictly positive, we conclude that both parameters  and  are strictly positive. Overall, the result is consistent with the model presented in Section 3 that patent holdup not only redistributes rents (  0), but also compromises long-run patent success (  0).
Shareholder Type and Overlap Concentration
In this subsection, we disaggregate the shareholder overlap into its components sorted by shareholder type. Ownership overlap by active shareholders should contribute more to the avoidance of cross-firm rent seeking than ownership overlap by passive shareholders. Following Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Yang (2013), we distinguish four types of institutional owners: (i) hedge fund ( ), (ii) bank and insurance companies (&) (iii) investment firms ( ) (including most mutual funds), and (iv) all  institutional investors such as pension funds, university endowments, etc. 18 We can decompose the firm-level shareholder overlap in Eq. (19) by investor type as
and thus identify the attenuation effect of shareholder overlap separately for each investor cathegory. Nothwithstanding considerable heterogeneity of shareholder activism within each group, hedge funds can be expected to exercise (on average) the most effective shareholder power, whereas the majority of pension funds (grouped under ) are likely to exert no influence on firm management and thus hold only formal shareholder power. Accordingly, we predict a larger holdup attenuation effect for _ compared to _
The regression results reported in Table 4 
where () and (  ) denote (as before) the relative importance weights for patents  and    respectively, and the ownership shares are measured at the end of year  − 1.   describes how concentrated the overlapping ownership stakes are at the firm level and thus captures the coordination problem among the overlapping investors. 
. This suggests that coordination problems among dispersed overlapping institutional investors represent an important impediment to the exercise of effective shareholder power.
Endogeneity Concerns and Patent-Level Regression
The firm-level regressions in the previous section control for a variety of observable firm characteristics as well as firm fixed effects. Yet, time varying (unobservable) influences on both patent success and shareholder overlap may still pose a concern for our inference. 19 In this section, we include not only firm and year fixed effects separately, but also their interaction   . Therefore, identification of the holdup attenuation effect on patent success relies entirely on the comparison of different patents filed by the same firm in the same year. Different patent filings by the same firm may list different upstream patents, resulting in patent-specific holdup and shareholder overlap even within the same firm-year. The patent-specific holdup attenuation is captured by the patent-level shareholder overlap  −1 in the following regression specification
where cites  denotes the future citation count of patent  filed in year . Similar to the firm-level regressions, all independent variables lag the dependent variable by one year.
The patent-level citation success cites  can only capture the intensive margin of patent production similar to Table 3 , Columns 1-3. But in contrast to the firm-level regressions in Table 3 , the patent-level data sample firms according to the number of patents filed. The estimated holdup attenuation effect therefore features a strong selection bias toward those firms with many patents.
In addition, more than 25% of firms with only one patent filed per year are discarded from the patent level regression.
The result in Table 5 shows that within-firm variation of the patent success is statistically significantly related to the patent-specific shareholder overlap . A coefficient of 0226 in Column 1 implies that an increase of shareholder overlap  by one standard deviation (0168) is related to an increase in the patent-level citation count by 28% (= 0226 × 0168  1361). This modest economic effect represents the hold-up attenuation effect on the intensive margin of the patent intensive firms. The 3 percent most patent intensive firms account for roughly 50% of all patent filing. Columns 2 and 3 present separate regressions for the 50% patents attributable to the 97% least and 3% most patent intensive firms, respectively. Column 4 present results only for the 3 industries with the most patent filings. In each case the coefficient for  is statistically highly significant at the 1 percent level. Patent success within a firm is therefore also correlated to the patent specific shareholder overlap  which differentiates different patents within the same firm and filing year.
6 Related Evidence
R&D Expenditure
So far the analysis is focused on patent success as the main measure of the holdup attenuation effect of ownership overlap; yet, the model also predicts a positive effect of shareholder overlap on R&D investment. To test this prediction, we undertake a linear regression
where Eqs. (14) and (20) We also note that the advertisement channel of reciprocal patent citations evoked in Section 5.4
cannot easily account for the positive effect of shareholder overlap on R&D expenditure-Although inflated patent citations might help boost (short-term) equity valuations, it is unclear why firm management would increase R&D investment in parallel to its own citation manipulation.
Patent Litigation
[Section to be added]
Dynamic Adjustment of Shareholder Overlap
The optimal ownership structure under patent holdup should dynamically adjust towards a more efficient ownership structure that combines ownership in complementary assets. Under private information about future patent hold-up, investors have an incentive to achieve this joint ownership through shareholder overlap-thus internalizing the hold-up problem. We might therefore expect that the shareholder overlap between the downstream and upstream firms increases prior to public disclosure of the patent filings. Moreover, this dynamic adjustment in shareholder overlap should be strongest for activist investors such as hedge funds.
For each year cohort of patents filed between 1996 and 2002, we measure evolution of the average firm-level shareholder overlap relative to the year of the patent filing. for hedge funds and only 3% for the overall shareholder overlap. After disclosure year  + 1 the shareholder overlap growth tends to decreases. Overall, the economic magnitude of the dynamic overlap adjustment appears small. Trading on private information about future hold-up rents might also expose the investors to insider trading charges and this may limit its scope. The static effect of increased shareholder overlap due to the long-run growth of institutional ownership appear to be qualitatively more important for the attenuation of patent hold-up.
Robustness
Alternative Hypotheses
This section discusses two alternative determinants of patent success and examines their empirical importance relative to shareholder overlap (). Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) argue that R&D investments have a long time horizon, and a high share of institutional investors allows management to focus on the long-term return to investment. Following their specification, we measure the share of institutional ownership () as the relevant proxy for investor patience. As institutional ownership also correlates with our shareholder overlap measure, it could potentially account for the firm-level evidence presented in Sections 5.1-5.3.
The second hypothesis concerns heterogeneous shareholder sophistication about innovation.
Some shareholders might bring particular knowledge to the innovation process, allowing for better governance of the innovating firm. In particular, investors can specialize in acquiring stakes in innovative firms with a disproportionate share of patents. Such a shareholder innovation focus is directly measurable based on ownership data in a simple three-step procedure. In the first step, we define for each listed firm the firm innovation focus (  ) as the ratio of the future citation count of all patents filed by firm  0 in year  to the industry average citation count during the same period. In the second step, we account for all institutional investors  in firm  and calculate their respective investor innovation focus ( ) as the value-weighted average firm innovation focus for all stocks  0 in their respective investment portfolios except for stock  itself. Formally,
where   0  represents the value weight of firm  0 in the portfolio of institutional investor  at the end of year  For any individual institutional shareholder primarily investing in innovative firms, the  value should be high. In the third step, the shareholder innovation focus ( ) for firm  is defined as the value-weighted average of investor innovation focus for all shareholders  in firm ,
where   represents the equity shares of firm  held by institutional investor  relative to the aggregate holdings of all institutional investors at the end of year  A firm mostly owned by investors with a high  should feature a high  value. Shareholders' governance competence (proxied by   ) with respect to the innovating firm  should have a positive effect on patent success of the firm. Table 7 presents the regression results for the two alternative hypotheses. Column 1 reproduces the benchmark regression reported in Column 1 of Table 2 . Column 2 of the table replaces
shareholder overlap  −1 with institutional ownership  −1 as the key explanatory variable. Unlike Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales (2013), we do not find that institutional ownership features a statistically significant correlation with the citation success of a firm. Including both shareholder overlap and institutional ownership in Column 3, we even find a negative effect of institutional ownership on patent success, whereas shareholder overlap retains its high positive level of economic and statistical significance. Table 7 , Column 4 includes shareholder innovation focus   as the third explanatory variable for patent success. We find that the general innovation focus of a firm's shareholders does not foster patent success of the respective firm after accounting for the  effect.
To verify that these results are robust, Columns 5-6 report analogous regressions based on the same (smaller) patent sample as that used by Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013). We also mimic their specification by using [CITES  ] as the dependent variable and apply the same control variables. 20 Column 5 reproduces their benchmark regression (reported in Table 1 , Column 2 of their paper) with the same statistically significant positive coefficient of 0546 for institutional ownership (). When we augment the regression with shareholder overlap  as an additional explanatory variable in Column 6, shareholder overlap remains statistically significant but not institutional ownership. The explanatory power of institutional ownership for patent success appears to arise from its correlation (0.385) with the shareholder overlap variable.
Measurement Issues
We subject a variety of measurement choices to a robustness analysis. 21 The first robustness test concerns the truncation nature of patent citations. Our baseline measure of   follows Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) in scaling the raw future citation count of each patent by a specific factor (see Table 5 
where patent success is captured by citation count over a three-year period (after the patent is granted) relative to the aggregate citation count of all   patents in the same USPTO technol- 20 Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) use [CITES  ] as the dependent variable in their benchmark regression in Table 1 , Column (2). They include   , (&   ), (  ), and (  ) as the regressors. We use the exact same set of variables in our regressions reported in Columns 5-6. Their dataset is available at: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.103.1.277. 21 A detailed documentation on these robustness test is available as Web Appendix to this paper on our website www.haraldhau.com. ogy class  The firm-level measure  _  follows as the sum of _  over all   successful patents filed by firm  in year  The importance weights () and (  ) in the calculation of shareholder overlap  are also based on _  . The modified shareholder overlap variable is denoted by _ Notwithstanding these variable modifications, we still find qualitatively similar results for the holdup attenuation effect of shareholder overlap.
The second robustness test concerns the measurement of shareholder overlap itself. As patent projects might be initiated several years before the application year  ownership overlap might also be accumulated earlier than year  − 1 (which is the measurement year for shareholder overlap used in our main analysis). We find that shareholder overlap measured based on equity stakes at the end of years  − 2  − 3 and  − 4 still produces statistically highly significant point estimates for , albeit with a smaller economic significance. This finding is consistent with a buildup of shareholder overlap prior to the filing of the downstream patent in year .
Third, our benchmark measure of firm-level shareholder overlap  uses importance weights based on citation count of patents. As an alternative measure, we replace the log citations count Fourth, we repeat Columns 1-3 of Table 2 but use ( ) as an alternative dependent variable. We discard all firm-year observations for which successful patent applications exist but these patents do not receive any citation (i.e.,   = 0). The economic significance of  remains high in this smaller sample; the point estimate suggests that an increase of  by one standard deviation increases the citation count   by roughly 20% in the firm fixed effect regression.
Conclusion
This paper provides a property rights perspective on the success of corporate innovation processes.
We argue that the success of patents often depends on access to complementary patents not under the direct control of the innovating firm. From a property rights perspective, the 'extended boundary' of the innovating firm includes such complementary patents if both the downstream innovator and the upstream firms owning these complementary patents are linked by joint shareholder ownership. This should particularly be the case if such joint shareholder ownership comes from activist investors who exercise power over both firms and therefore mitigate the holdup problem in corporate innovation processes.
Our identification strategy is based on patent documents that directly list related precursory patents, which may have rival patent claims to new products. We define shareholder overlap () as the (importance weighted) aggregate minimum ownership share that investors own jointly in both the innovating firm and the firms controlling the complementary assets; an innovating firm with a large  value can be interpreted as having an extended firm boundary.
We document the role of shareholder overlap for patent success both at the firm level and the patent level; it positively correlates with both the intensive and extensive margin of patent production in an economically significant manner. This finding is robust to a variety of control variables and the inclusion of time and firm (or industry) fixed effects. Using interacted firm and time fixed effects, we show that two patents from the same year cohort filed by the same firm perform differently depending on their respective (patent-level) shareholder overlap. We also find that shareholder overlap coming from more active investors such as hedge funds tend to contribute more to the holdup attenuation-suggesting that the 'extended boundary' of the innovating firm depends also on the type of institutional shareholders. Furthermore, the ownership concentration of shareholder overlap matters independently of its level, suggesting coordination and free-rider problems among a large group of overlapping shareholders.
Our paper also documents economically and statistically significant effects of shareholder overlap on other variables of the patent process in accordance with the holdup attenuation hypothesis:
R&D expenditure is positively correlated with the firm-level shareholder overlap, whereas the probability of patent litigation decreases in shareholder overlap.
Finally, we provide a dynamic perspective on efficient equity ownership: Ownership overlap increases modestly prior to public disclosure of patent files for activist shareholders like hedge funds. Yet this dynamic integration of ownership is likely to play only a minor role for the attenuation of patent hold-ups. Quantitatively more important is the long-run increase in institutional ownership with its significant intertemporal increase in shareholder overlap.  also exclude citations coming from all firms quoted by patent  (for filter  1) and all firms that patent 's innovator has ever quoted previously (for filter  2), respectively. The explanatory variables  −1 and  −1 , refer to the shareholder overlap for firm  or a patent , respectively We separate shareholder overlap by investor types which are hedge funds (_ ), bank and insurance companies (_&), investment firms (_ ), and others (_).  −1 is the aggregate institutional ownership of firm  as of the end of year  − 1. The shareholder innovation focus  −1 is defined as the investment bias of a firm's shareholders towards firms with a large share of patents.    −1 represents the weighted HHI of shareholder overlap concentration for firm  in year  − 1. The control variables include the (log of) lagged cumulative R&D investment, (1 + &  −1 ); lagged capital to labor ratio, (1 +  −1 ); and lagged sales, (1 +  −1 ). The variable definitions are described in detail in the appendix.
Obs.
Mean Median STD Skewness Min. P10 P90 Max.
Dependent Variables (measured in year )
489 895 1954 2020 1361 0085 0000 0000 3707 6969
Independent Variables (measured in year  − 1)  17 674 0147 0135 0108 0603 0000 0000 0297 0700 _ 17 674 0008 0004 0011 3283 0000 0000 0021 0229 _& 17 674 0068 0063 0052 0659 0000 0000 0139 0357 _ 17 674 0056 0049 0047 1167 0000 0000 0119 0673 _ 17 674 0015 0010 0016 1906 0000 0000 0036 0264  489 895 0296 0295 0168 0177 0000 0067 0518 0851  17 674 0201 0200 0057 1735 0000 0136 0269 1810  17 674 0485 0507 0265 −0099 0000 0102 0825 1000    17 674 0150 0098 0156 2222 0000 0000 0351 1000 Controls (measured in year  − 1) We denote by   the number of successful patents filed by firm  in year , and by   the average future citations per patent for the cohort of patents successfully filed by firm  in year . Shareholder overlap measures the average shareholder ownership overlap between the innovating firm and other firms owning the precursory complementary patents. The control variables include the (log of) lagged cumulative R&D investment, (1 + &  −1 ); lagged capital to labor ratio, (1 +  −1 ); and lagged sales, (1 +  −1 ). Presample mean cites count denotes the average future cites count the firm receives per pre-sample year. Industry fixed effects is based on four-digit SIC codes. All regressions report robust -statistics clustered at firm and year levels in brackets. We denote by *, **, and *** statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The variable definitions are described in more detail in the appendix.
Dependent Variables: The baseline regression in Table 2 are repeated for a split of shareholder overlap ( −1 ) into four components which represent hedge funds (_ ), bank and insurance companies (_&), investment firms (_ ), and others (_) respectively. The regressions in Column 5-6 expand the baseline regressions by a direct measure of Herfindahl-Hirschman index of shareholder overlap,    −1 , instead of a variable decomposition. The control variables include the (log of) lagged cumulative R&D investment, (1 + &  −1 ); lagged capital to labor ratio, (1 +  −1 ); and lagged sales, (1 +  −1 ). Pre-sample mean cites count denotes the average future cites count the firm receives per pre-sample year. All regressions report robust -statistics clustered at firm and year levels in brackets. The last row of the table reports -values for the null hypothesis that the estimated regression coefficients are the same for _ , _&, _ and _. We denote by *, **, and *** the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The variable definitions are described in more detail in the appendix.
Dependent Variable:
(1 +  ) This table presents the correlation between patent success measured at the patent level and the lagged shareholder overlap for the sample period 1992 − 2007. Patent success is proxied by (1 +   ) as the (log) future citation count received by a patent  filed in year . Columns 1 reports the full sample. Columns 2-3 feature the subsample of patents from firms with smaller patent filing count that covers bottom 50% and from firms with larger patent filing count that covers top 50% of patents. Column 4 concerns the 3 industries with the most R&D expenditures. We drop firm-year where only one patent is filed since we have controlled for firm fixed effects. All regressions report robust -statistics clustered at firm and year levels in brackets. We denote by *, **, and *** the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The variable definitions are described in more detail in the appendix. 
0329
0358 0298 0316 Reported are OLS regressions of R&D expenditure on the lagged shareholder overlap for the sample period 1992− 2007. R&D expenditure is measured for every firm-year ( ) and  −1 represents firm-level shareholder overlap with all cited firms in the successful patent applications of firm  in year  − 1 The control variables include lagged capital to labor ratio, (1+ −1 ); and lagged sales, (1+ −1 ). Industry fixed effects is based on four-digit SIC codes. All regressions report robust -statistics clustered at firm and year levels in brackets. We denote by *, **, and *** the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The variable definitions are described in more detail in the appendix 
0666
0933 0925 
